This paper shows that a small country can have incentives to tax inbound FDI even in a setting with perfect competition and free entry. While investors make no aggregate prots worldwide due to free entry, they make taxable prots in foreign production locations because their costs are partly incurred in their home country. These prots are not perfectly mobile because rm productivity varies across locations. Consequently, the host country does not bear the entire burden of a tax on foreign investors and this gives rise to an incentive to impose taxes. The standard zero optimal tax result can be recovered in this model under a cost-apportionment system that ensures zero economic prots in each location.
Introduction
A central result in the theory of international taxation suggests that small countries should not impose taxes on inbound FDI (Gordon, 1986). 1 This is because a small country faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital and so the burden of any tax on foreign investors falls entirely on domestic immobile factors. It would therefore be preferable tob tax the immobile factors directly instead of unnecessarily reducing inbound investment. The existing literature has interpreted this result to be an implication of the Diamond-Mirlees (1971) framework, where rms are competitive and households receive no prots. The literature suggests that incentives to tax foreign investors arise only in settings that depart from the Diamond-Mirlees framework, which entails introducing market imperfections, entry restrictions or policy instrument limitations.
The current paper explains why it can be optimal for small countries to tax foreign investors even in a perfectly competitive setting with free entry.
Free entry into production implies that investors from each country make no aggregate prots worldwide and so there are no economic prots that accrue to households.
2 Nevertheless, investors can make positive taxable prots in foreign production locations because the initial investment costs that enable production globally are incured in the investor's home country. These profits are not perfectly mobile because owing to productivity dierences arising from uncertainty associated with entry, some investors nd it more protable to produce in a particular country than they would elsewhere in the world.
When a host country taxes foreign investors, it taxes away a portion of the prots of these inframarginal investors. While this will aect business creation incentives in the rest of the world, a small country does not internalize this eect. As a result of this externality, domestic agents do not bear the entire burden of the tax and the host country therefore has an incentive to tax foreign investors.
The benchmark zero tax result can be recovered in this model under a specic system of cost apportionment. If the initial investment costs were apportioned to each country proportionately to the prots made in the location, investors would earn no aggregate economic prots location by location, just as in Gordon (1986) . With such an apportionment system, the host country would no longer have an incentive to tax foreign investors. It is natural, therefore, to interpret the optimal zero tax results as implicitly assuming an apportionment regime that guarantees zero prots in each location. Note, however, that while such a regime would be ecient from a global standpoint, it would not be incentive-compatible: the host country has a unilateral incentive to not allow the apportioned investment costs to be deductible.
3
In addition to the benchmark zero tax result, this paper is connected to a literature that studies business taxation in the presence of location rents.
4
This literature shows that countries can have incentives to impose taxes on foreign investors if a portion of the prots earned by foreign rms in a location could not be earned elsewhere in the world. The key contribution of the current paper is to explain how location rents from the standpoint of the host country can exist even in a setting where free entry guarantees that there are no true rents that accrue to any households. This distinction is substantively important because it illustrates how a rent-like motive for taxing foreign investors can exist in an open economy setting even when rms are fully subjected to competitive pressures. This paper also makes a contribution to a growing literature on inter-3 See Huizinga (1992) for a related point in the context of the R&D expenditures of multinational enterprises. 4 See for example, Mintz and Tulkens (1996) , Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and Devereux and Hubbard (2003) .
jurisdictional taxation with heterogeneous rms. Burbidge et al. (2006) and Davies and Eckel (2010) study settings where rm heterogeneity gives rise to location rents. These models depart from the Diamond-Mirlees framework by allowing for positive aggregate prots and/or imperfect competition. Since these features are themselves capable of breaking the zero optimal tax result in settings without rm heterogeneity, the role of rm heterogeneity per se becomes more dicult to interpret. The current paper introduces producer heterogeneity without introducing other factors that could independently break the zero tax result and highlights the key role of the implicit apportionment system in generating location rents from the standpoint of the host country.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies optimal taxation. Section 4 discusses some additional implications of the model. Section 5 concludes.
Model

Households
I study a setting with two countries: a small country and the rest of the world. The representative household in each country consumes a single nal good that will be the numeraire, and is endowed with labor and capital.
Labor is internationally immobile with the wage in country i given by w i , and capital is mobile with rental rate r. Given that there is a single nal good and this good is the numeraire, welfare in country i is given by the income of the representative households:
where L i and K i are the inelastic supplies of labor and capital, respectively; and T i is government revenue rebated lump sum to the household. Note that there are no prots that enter into the household's budget because free entry will guarantee zero aggregate prots in equilibrium.
There are two points to note here in connection with Diamond and Mirlees (1971) . First, the presence of a lump sum transfer indicates that I am studying a rst-best setting instead of a second-best one unlike in much of the public nance literature. This is not an important dierence in the context of the current paper because my main result is that the optimal tax rate on inbound FDI income is positive. If such a tax is optimal even in a rst-best setting, it will be optimal a fortiori in a second-best context. Second, the Diamond-Mirlees framework requires that households receive no pure profits, either because there are no pure prots or because pure prots can taxed away at 100%. In this paper, the requirement that households receive no pure prots will be satised directly without a 100% tax on prots. This means that there are no pure prots in this model in the sense relevant for the production eciency theorem, even though individual rms produce under decreasing returns to scale and do make variable prots. Put dierently, Firms with dierent levels of productivity can co-exist in equilibrium despite perfect competition because each rm has a decreasing returns to scale production function. The decreasing returns to scale can be interpreted as reecting the presence of an implicit rm-specic factor. The initial investment that enables production is the process by which this rm-specic factor is brought into existence. Given that the implicit rm-specic factor essentially determines each rm's productivity across the world, we could also interpret this initial entry process as an R&D investment with an uncertain return.
An alternative to the current setup would be a model with monopolistically competitive rms, such as Helpman et al. (2004) . While assuming a decreasing returns to scale production function at the rm level is similar in many respects to a framework with rm-level product dierentiation, there are a few important dierences for the purposes of the current paper.
First, imperfect competition generally introduces a pre-existing distortion that complicates the interpretation of an optimal tax problem. Second, in a monopolistically competitive setting, goods are dierentiated at the rm level and so even small countries have terms-of-trade eects.
5 Finally, a perfectly competitive ensures that the current analysis remains within the Diamond-Mirlees framework.
Firm Problem
With this basic setup in mind, we can solve the model starting with the rm's problem. A rm will be indexed by a vector of productivity parameters (z 1 ,z 2 ), wherez i is the productivity parameter in country i. A rm with productivity parameterz i that has chosen to produce in country i whose home country is j solves the following problem:
where the choice variables l and k are the quantities of labor and capital, respectively, used by the rm; τ ij is the tax rate faced by an investor in country i that is from country j. I will assume that τ ij = τ i for i = j and τ ii = 0: all foreign investors face the same tax rate while domestic investors are untaxed. 6 F (.) exhibits decreasing returns to scale and is assumed to be homogeneous of degree λ < 1. Under this homogeneity assumption, the pre-tax variable prot function π ij (w i , r,z i ) can be written asz i 1/(1−λ) π ij (w, r) (see Appendix A1 for the proof ). For notational simplicity, I will dene z i ≡z
and work with z i instead ofz i henceforth. The pre-tax variable prot function is then z i π ij (w i , r). We can also dene the supply and factor demand 5 See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for more discussion of the complications that can arise when interpreting optimal trade policy questions in imperfectly competitive models.
6 Domestic rms being untaxed is not essential to the central point of this paper. This assumption allows us to clearly see that the incentives to tax foreign investors do not arise from the presence of scal externalities of any kind.
functions that arise from the rm's problem: x ij (w i , r, z i ), l ij (w i , r, z i ) and k ij (w i , r, z i ).
The tax system here allows for the deduction of all variable capital expenses and so is essentially a cash-ow tax. Such a tax does not distort the rm's intensive margin decision regarding how much labor and capital to use in production. However, the tax will still be distortionary because it will aect a rm's extensive margin decision concerning which country to produce in. Due to this extensive margin distortion, this assumption does not qualitatively alter the main argument made in this paper. Even if the tax base included the regular return to capital, part of the tax burden would still fall upon foreigners. A consideration that I have ignored here is that of potential royalty payments from the foreign aliate to its parent for the use of the parent's technology. This is an important question that I postpone to subsection 4.1.
An investor chooses which country to produce in by comparing the prots it would make in each. It will locate in country i if it makes more prots by producing in i than in it would in the alternative country 7 :
where the notation −i refers to the country that is not i. We can dene the set of rms from j that locate in i as follows:
Further, I dene the boundary set of Θ ij where the condition dening the set holds with equality as ∂Θ ij .
Free Entry and Market Clearing
So far, I have discussed the problem solved by investors that have already drawn their productivities. I now turn to the entry process. An investor can choose to pay a xed cost and thereby draw a productivity vector z from a joint distribution G(z) with joint density g(z). Across investors, the draws are independently and identically distributed. I assume that the components of z are not perfectly correlated and that z is bounded below at zero and has a nite upper-bound. These assumptions guarantee an interior solution where both potential production locations are always chosen by some investors from each country.
In equilibrium, a potential entrant makes zero expected prots net of the initial xed costs. The required xed costs in terms of labor and capital and will be denoted f i and φ i , respectively. The free entry condition in country j is then:
The left-hand side of (2.3) gives us the expected prots of a potential entrant. We need to sum over i because a rm could choose either country as the location of production. The term dz is a two-dimensional volume dierential.
If there is entry in equilibrium, the free entry condition will hold with equality.
Note that this setup assumes investors are risk-neutral. Since there are a continuum of rms, the free entry condition implies that aggregate prots net of the xed costs are equal to zero. This ensures that the fundamentals of the current model are consistent with Diamond and Mirlees (1971) since households will receive no pure prots. The presence of a continuum of rms also implies that there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model. The model is closed by market clearing conditions for the nal good and for the factors of production. For the nal good, the condition is:
where m j is the measure of entrants from country j. Note that since there is a single nal good and this good is the numeraire, the demand for the good the left-hand side is equal to world income. The term on the right hand side of (2.4) is the world supply of the good. We sum over j to take into account the production of rms from each country and sum over i to aggregate across both locations of production. The market clearing conditions for labor and capital are:
The two terms on the right-hand side of the factor market clearing conditions capture the fact that each factor is used to pay the xed costs as well as being a direct input into production. Note that we sum over i for capital but not labor because capital is internationally mobile and so this market clears worldwide rather than country-by-country.
3 Optimal Taxation
Preliminaries
This section will study the optimal taxation of foreign rms from the standpoint of a small host country that will be denoted as country 1. The small country takes r and w 2 as given. Since it has a negligible eect on the ag-gregate prots of foreign rms, it also takes the mass of entrants in the rest of the world as given.
8 The variables that are endogenous from the point of view of the small country are its domestic wage, the set of rms that choose to site in the country and the mass of domestic rms. These variables are determined by country 1's labor market clearing condition, the location choice problem of rms, and by country 1's free entry condition.
Before turning to the government's problem, it will be useful to dene several terms. The total after-tax prots made by foreign rms in country 1 is given by:
Next, we can dene the inframarginal prots earned by foreign rms in country 1 as:
These inframarginal prots are dened as the dierence between the after-tax prots made by foreign aliates in country 1 and the counterfactual prots they would make in country 2. This expression captures the prots made by foreign aliates in excess of what they would require in order to site in the host country. These inframarginal prots are location rents from the standpoint of the host country. They are not true rents in a global sense, however, because these prots enter into the foreign free-entry condition rather than accruing to foreign households. In Appendix A.2, I derive the derivatives of (1 − τ 1 ) Π 12 and R 12 for later use. 
Taxes, Welfare and the Optimal Tax Rate
We can now study the welfare eects of host-country taxation. I will focus on an equilibrium where there are no domestically owned rms and leave the simpler case with domestic rms to Appendix A.3. Given that there is a single nal good and this good is the numeraire, welfare is simply given by the representative household's income:
The eect of the tax on welfare is:
Noting that we are considering the case without domestic rms (i.e. L 1 = L 12 ) and evaluating this expression at τ 1 = 0, we obtain:
where the second equality follows from an expression derived in Appendix A.2. To interpret the above result, note that dR 12 /dτ 1 is the eect of taxes on the inframarginal prots of foreign aliates. This term captures the portion of the tax incidence that is not borne by domestic agents, since a reduction in the inframarginal prots of foreign aliates does not aect incentives to invest in country 1. Unsurprisingly, host country taxation will reduce these inframarginal prots (see Appendix A.3 for the formal proof ) and so the small country will necessarily benet from a suciently small tax:
In addition to showing that a small tax will improve welfare, we can also derive a formula for the optimal tax rate (see Appendix A.4. for the derivation):
This formula shows that the optimal tax rate depends on two key expressions.
The numerator, as discussed earlier, captures the eect of the tax that is not borne by domestic agents. To the extent the tax is borne by foreigners, the optimal tax rate will be larger. The denominator captures the overall responsiveness of after-tax prots to host-country taxation. If prots are very responsive to taxes, we expect a greater behavioral distortion, and so the optimal tax rate will be smaller.
An important point to note throughout this analysis is that all of the derivations here would be the same whether the total mass of entrants in the rest of the world is determined by free entry or just xed at some exogenous value. This is because either way, it is xed from the standpoint of the small country which has a negligible eect on the aggregate worldwide prots of foreign rms. As a result, even though there are no rents that accrue to foreign households, from the standpoint of the small country, the situation is no dierent from one where the foreign households did receive rents from the activities of its rms.
4 Additional Discussion
Cost Apportionment and Zero Tax Result
This subsection will discuss the relationship between my results and the standard optimal zero tax results in the literature (e.g. Gordon, 1986 ). In my model, foreign aliates make taxable prots in a host country despite the fact that there are no aggregate prots. We can obtain zero prots location by location in the current model as in a setting that directly assumes constant returns to scale production functions if we assume the presence of a specic type of cost apportionment system. Specically, we require that initial investment costs are apportioned to each country proportionately to the prots made in that country. Multiplying the free entry condition (2.3) that holds with equality by the mass of rms that enter in country j, we obtain:
This condition simply states that the total prots of investors from country j excluding xed costs are equal to the total xed costs incurred in entry. If a share s ij of the prots of rms from j were earned from production undertaken in i, the proposed apportionment system would imply that xed costs equal to s ij (m j f j w j + m j φ j r) would be apportioned to country i. Consequently, the total prots apportioned to country i net of the xed costs would be equal to zero:
Thus, with such an apportionment system, there would be no economic prots earned in the host country, and so the basis for the positive optimal tax on foreign investors would no longer be present. A cash ow tax which is the type of tax considered in the previous sections would simply generate no revenue. If marginal capital expenses were not fully deductible, then the benchmark optimal zero tax result would hold directly. We can thus interpret the benchmark as implicitly assuming that there is a system which apportions costs so that prots are equal to zero location by location.
A natural example of such an apportionment system would be a specic type of royalty system. If the aliate is making use of rm-specic assets that are owned by the parent, it should make royalty payments to the parent.
It is natural to think of a royalty payment that is based on an arms-length valuation of the implicit rm-specic asset used by the foreign aliate. If unrelated foreign aliates could pay for this implicit asset, the equilibrium payment would be equal to the prots that can be made through its use. This is because any payment in excess would cause a loss to the buyer of the asset, while any payment less than prots will give rise to an innite demand for the asset. If we employ this type of pricing for the asset, the aliate would pay (1 − τ i ) z i π ij (w i , r) as royalties, and as a result, make no taxable prots.
Note that this type of cost apportionment would not be incentive-compatible.
The host country would have an incentive to either tax the royalty payments or limit their deductibility. The royalty payments in this case would in fact be identical to what I have been calling prots so far, and the entire analysis as applied to prots would then apply to royalty payments instead. The model thus also suggests that countries have incentives to tax royalty payments from foreign aliates to their parents for the same reason they have incentives to tax prots. This is consistent with the fact that most countries impose taxes on cross-border royalty payments.
A further point to note here is that the royalty system in place in the world does not conform to this theoretically ideal system even aside from taxes and deduction limitations for at least two important reasons. First, only certain specic aspects of a parent's overall contribution to an aliate's productivity will trigger royalty payments in reality. For example, if an aliate is productive because of the parent rm's business culture or the quality of its general administration, this may not give rise to corresponding royalty payments. Second, this ideal system would be implausible from an informational standpoint. Standard transfer pricing methods would be unlikely to capture the protability of an individual technology given that all rms have made the same initial investment.
Global Distortions
The previous section showed that a small host country that maximizes domestic welfare has an incentive to impose taxes on foreign investors. While optimal from the standpoint of a country that is acting unilaterally, these taxes are distortionary from the point of view of the world as a whole for two reasons. First, the taxes will aect location choice, as is evident from (2.2). This is because while all explicit costs are deductible, the opportunity costs the prots that could be earned elsewhere in the world are not. As a result, taxes will aect the location of production as is standard in models of international taxation.
This rst distortion would be absent if the opportunity costs were hypothetically deductible so that the tax would apply only to the inframarginal prots. There is a second distortion that would exist even if opportunity costs were deductible. This second distortion arises because taxes aect the expected prot of an entrant (see (2.3)). We can imagine an alternative model to the current one where we drop the free entry conditions (2.3), and the mass of entrants are treated as exogenous. In this alternative model, a hypothetical tax on inframarginal prots would merely be a lump sum transfer from one country to another that has no behavioral eects. Thus, the endogeneity of rm creation which is governed by the free entry condition causes an additional global distortion.
9
Because countries have unilateral incentives to tax foreign investors even when this tax is globally distortionary, the model suggests potential incentives for countries to coordinate to mutually reduce the taxes imposed on foreign investors. This is consistent with the fact that bilateral tax treaties entail reductions in dividend withholding tax rates. The discussion concerning royalties in 4.1 suggests that countries have incentives to tax royalties that are similar to the incentives to tax prots. This model thus also provides a possible explanation for why countries use royalty withholding taxes and why these taxes are reduced by bilateral tax treaties.
Implications for Tax Competition
In this model, there are location rents from the small country's standpoint because of which it will have unilateral incentives to tax foreign investors. 10 The model thus identies a mechanism because of which increased globalization need not be a downward pressure on tax rates.
11
Given the forces that drive the incentives to tax foreigners, the model suggests two factors that could potentially mitigate the eects of tax competition in reality. First, greater globalization increases the likelihood that 9 Note also that this distortion is distinct from a potential distortion to world savings that would arise if capital supply were not perfectly inelastic. 10 In a closed economy, a cash-ow tax would either raise no revenues (if the xed costs are deductible) or would be sub-optimal because it causes production ineciency (if the xed costs are not deductible).
11 It should be noted that the incentives discussed here apply to taxes on the taxable economic prots of foreign investors. To the extent that variable capital expenses are not deductible, the standard forces leading to downward pressures on tax rates would still be present.
investments undertaken in one country contribute to protability elsewhere in the world. As a result, countries are likely to host rms whose protability may be connected with investments that were not specically made with the host country in mind. To the extent that this is the case, host countries would have increased incentives to tax foreign investors.
The second reason is one that has been discussed in the literature before but is present in the current model in a particularly sharp manner. The increasing share of foreign ownership of rms should imply a greater incentive to impose taxes on business income in general (Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997) .
12
The existing literature makes this claim in a context where there are rents which give rise to conceptually similar incentives to tax domestic and foreign rms. In the current paper, host-country incentives arise from an externality imposed on the rest of the world and thus these incentives are more directly connected to taxing foreign investors specically.
12 See also Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) , who provide empirical evidence that higher foreign ownership is associated with higher corporate tax rates.
Conclusion
This paper shows that small host countries can have incentives to tax inbound FDI even in a competitive setting with free entry. While investors make no aggregate prots worldwide, they make taxable prots in foreign production locations because part of their investment costs are incurred in their home country. Due to rm productivity dierences, some rms will be inframarginal in a foreign location. By taxing foreign investors, host countries can partially tax these inframarginal prots. While such taxes discourage investment in the rest of the world, a small country does not internalize this eect and thus has an incentive to tax foreign investors.
A literature based on Diamond and Mirlees (1971) has served as the basis for much of the policy advice in the area of international taxation.
The current paper shows that one important piece of advice that is usually taken to be an implication of this framework that small countries should not impose source-base investment taxes need not hold even within the framework itself. The reason for this is that location rents that justify taxes on inbound FDI can exist from the standpoint of a host country even in a setting where expected prots are competed away by entry. This analysis thus identies incentives to tax inbound FDI that are likely to be relevant across a wide range of countries and industries.
A Proofs
A.1 Prot Function Property
In this appendix, I show that we can write the variable pre-tax prots in the following separable form: π ij (w i , r,z i ) =z 1/(1−λ) i π ij (w i , r). First, note that from the homogeneity of the production function, we can use Euler's rule to obtain:
whereλ < 1 is the returns to scale parameter. The rst-order conditions are:z i F l (.) = w i andz i F k (.) = r. Using the rst-order condition, the rm's variable prots before taxes are:
Thus, the rm's variable prots are proportional to rm sales.
Next, we can dierentiate maximized prots,z i F (.)−wl−rk, with respect toz i using the envelope theorem to get:
The above expression is a separable rst-order dierential equation and can be solved as follows:
In order to solve for the constant of integration e c , we can setz i to some arbitrary value -say one -to obtain:
If we dene π ij (w i , r) ≡ π ij (w i , r, 1), then the prots of an individual rm can be expressed as being proportional to a general term that is common to all rms: π ij (w i , r,z i ) =z
A. 
where L 12 is the total labor used by foreign rms in country i. In taking the derivative (rst equality above), I use a generalization of Leibniz's rule for dierentiating an integral. The rst term captures the change in prots that arises from changes in the prots of inframarginal rms, using Hotelling's Lemma to dierentiate the prot function. The second term captures the change in prots due to a change in the set of rms that locate in the country.
The term v is a two-dimensional vector that captures how the boundary set changes with the tax rate (i.e. the velocity of the boundary set), u is the unit normal vector and ds is the surface dierential. The derivative of R 12 can be derived in a similar manner:
The third after the rst equality captures the change in the set of rms locating in the country as a result of the tax rate change. It is equal to zero because rms on the boundary set ∂Θ 12 make no inframarginal prots by denition.
A.3 Positive Optimal Tax Rate
This appendix proves that the optimal tax rate is positive. I rst deal with the case without domestic rms, which is also the case discussed in the main text. The main text shows that the optimal tax rate will be positive if dR 12 /dτ 1 < 0.
Note now that a rm that is on the boundary set, i.e. z ∈ ∂Θ 12 , will be indierent between locating in country 1 and country 2:
(1 − τ 1 ) z 1 π 12 (w 1 , r) = z 2 π 22 (w 2 , r)
(1 − τ 1 ) π 12 (w 1 , r) = a 12 π 22 (w 2 , r) ,
where a 12 is the cuto value of z 2 /z 1 that denes the indierent rm. For later use, note that (A.3) implies a function a 12 = γ(w 1 , τ 1 ), with ∂γ/∂w 1 < 0 and ∂γ/∂τ 1 < 0. Thus, the sign of dR 12 /dτ 1 will be the same as the sign of da 12 /dτ 1 . Since higher taxes will cause rms to leave country 1, it follows that the new marginal rm will be one that is relatively more productive in country 1, i.e. da 12 /dτ 1 < 0. To show this formally, we need to use the labor market clearing condition.
With no domestic rms, the labor market clearing condition is: is the upper-bound on productivity for z 1 . The right-hand side above is decreasing in w 1 and increasing in a 12 . Thus, this expression denes a positive relationship between w 1 and a 12 . This is intuitive: at a xed wage, more rms would mean that labor supply exceeds labor demand, necessitating an increase in the wage to restore equilibrium. We can express this relationship as a function: a 12 = δ(w 1 ) with ∂δ/∂w 1 > 0. This function, together with γ(w 1 , τ 1 ) dened earlier implies that an increase in τ 1 will shift down γ(.) and cause a movement along δ(.) corresponding to a lower wage. Consequently, dw 1 /dτ 1 < 0 and da 12 /dτ 1 < 0. This should be unsurprising:
higher taxes on FDI reduce the number of rms that site in the host country and reduce domestic wages.
The case with domestic rms operating in equilibrium is simpler from the point of view of optimal taxation. In this case, the domestic free-entry condition holds with equality:
z 1 π 11 (w 1 , r) g(z)dz +Θ
21
(1 − τ 2 ) z 2 π 21 (w 2 , r) g(z)dz = f 1 w 1 + φ 1 r Dierentiating this expression, we obtain:
l 11 (w 1 , r, z 1 ) g(z)dz +∂ Θ 11
(v · u) z 1 π 11 (w 1 , r) g(z)ds
(v · u) (1 − τ 2 ) z 1 π 21 (w 2 , r) g(z)ds = f 1 dw 1 dτ 1
Note that:´∂ Θ 11
(v · u) z 1 π 11 (w 1 , r) g(z)ds =´∂ Θ 21 (v · u) (1 − τ 2 ) z 1 π 21 (w 2 , r) g(z)ds because a marginal rm by denition would make the same prot if it located in the foreign country. Thus, the total prot loss for a marginal rm as a result of higher host-country taxation is equal to zero. Consequently:
Since dw 1 /dτ 1 = 0, it follows immediately that the optimal tax rate will be positive in this case.
A.4 Optimal Tax Formula
This appendix will derive a formula for the optimal tax rate. As shown in the main text, the rst-order condition for the optimal tax formula is:
L 12 dw 1 dτ 1 + Π 12 + τ 1 dΠ 12 dτ 1 = 0
Using (A.1) and (A.2), we can obtain the following:
Thus, the optimal tax rate is:
(1 − τ 1 )Π 12
